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et al.: Reed v. Reed at 40: Equal Protection and Women's Rights

REED V. REED AT 40:
EQUAL PROTECTION AND
WOMEN’S RIGHTS
BEGIN TRANSCRIPT*

NINA TOTENBERG: I’m Nina Totenberg, and I’m delighted to be
here at this wonderful event celebrating the fortieth anniversary of Reed v.
Reed.1 If any of you are in the corridor, please come in. Don’t be afraid to
sit in the front; that’s where the seats are. Actually, at this point, because
this is still like class, everybody’s afraid to come to the front row. There
are so many professors here.
This is really a wonderful event. There are 700 people who are
registered for it, and there’s another group of Georgetown Law students in
an auditorium where this is being broadcasted. And we have every school
in the area cosponsoring: American University, George Washington
University, Georgetown University, Howard University, and UDC
Colleges of Law. They all have their separate names, but I won’t go into
that. Also, the National Women’s Law Center and the Women’s Bar
Association for the District of Columbia, and I don’t think I’ve left
anybody out. But if I have, I will be reminded of that, I’m sure.
I am old enough that I actually remember Reed v. Reed being argued. I
was a novice Supreme Court reporter, brand new on the beat, and I didn’t
know anything from Shinola, and I was just reading everything I could get
my hands on. And I found that, by and large, I really could understand
*

Adapted transcript of Reed v. Reed at 40: Equal Protection and Women’s Rights
held at the National Press Club on November 17, 2001. Panel: Nina Totenberg,
Legal Affairs Correspondent, NPR (moderator); Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Principal Author of Brief for Sally Reed in Reed v. Reed; Emily Martin, Vice
President & General Counsel, National Women’s Law Center; Professor Earl
Maltz, Rutgers Law School; Jacqueline A. Berrien, Chair, U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission; Professor Nina Pillard, Georgetown University Law
Center.
1. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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things if I just read all the briefs. But I came across this case, Reed v. Reed,
which said that women were covered by the Fourteenth Amendment. And
I thought to myself, “Hmm, I thought the Fourteenth Amendment was for
freed slaves and for blacks. How does that apply to women?” And I
flipped to the front of the brief to see who had written it. It was this
Rutgers law professor named Ruth Bader Ginsburg. And I said, “Well, I’m
going to call her up.”
I called her up and she gave me about an hour-long lecture, the bottom
line of which is the Fourteenth Amendment says no person shall be denied
equal protection of the law; and as she put it, the last she checked, women
were people. [laughter]. And it was the beginning of a long friendship and
association, first on the phone and then in person. And p.s., after my late
husband died and I remarried, she performed the wedding ceremony. She’s
definitely a person.
It’s my really nice duty to introduce her. She’s the right person to be
headlining this event since she did write the briefs in Reed. And she will
introduce the wonderful man who argued the case, who we’re very lucky to
have in the audience today. But none of us would probably be here in the
jobs that we’re in without Ruth Ginsburg. She truly revolutionized the law
for women. None of us work in a workplace that bears any resemblance to
the workplaces of thirty and forty years ago. I should just mention that
Marcia Greenberger, who was going to be on this panel and who is co-head
of the Women’s Law Center, but [was unable to make it at the last minute].
But I asked her last night, I said, “By the way, who provided the seed
money for the Women’s Law Center way back when?” I really couldn’t
remember. And she said, “The Ford Foundation did, and we were part of
the Center for Law and Social Policy.” And they decided that they would
have a Women’s Law section of that, and they hired Marcia to do it. Her
first job was to ascertain whether there really was enough work for a single
lawyer to do, because they assumed that there probably wasn’t and that she
should do some other things as well. So that’s how much life changed over
the course of time. So now, let me introduce Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
[applause].
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: My role is simply to
introduce Reed v. Reed in a nutshell. Sally Reed lived in Boise, Idaho. She
was an everyday woman who made her living by caring for people unable
to cope for themselves. She had a son. She and her husband were
divorced. When the boy reached teen years, the judge thought it was a
good idea for him to spend some time with his father to be prepared for a
man’s world. Sally opposed that. She didn’t think the father would be a
very good influence on the boy. And she was right.
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One day, the boy was shot from one of his father’s rifles. It was an
apparent suicide. Sally wanted to be appointed administrator of his estate,
not for any economic advantage—there was very little there—but for
sentimental reasons. Her ex-husband put in a rival application and
although his application was second in time, he was selected. The probate
judge had no choice. The Idaho code read: “As between persons equally
entitled to administer a decedent’s estate, males must be preferred to
females.”2 Sally thought the law was unjust and she engaged a lawyer
from Boise, Allen Derr, who is with us this afternoon. [applause]. Allen
took Sally’s case through three levels of the Idaho courts, losing in the first
round, winning in the second, but then losing in the third.
When Law Week reported the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Reed
v. Reed,3 one of my colleagues at the ACLU, a great lawyer named Marvin
Karpatkin, read the summary and said, “This will be the turning point
gender discrimination case.” And so the ACLU filed a request for Supreme
Court review. The Supreme Court took the case. I then asked the ACLU’s
legal director, Mel Wulf, if I could write the brief. Allen Derr had said he
was glad to have the ACLU do the written part, but he would present the
case in the Supreme Court.
I regard Reed v. Reed as the grandparent brief. We had many other cases
before the Court in the seventies. They were all variations on the same
theme. A law that provides males must be preferred to females does not
recognize women’s equal citizenship stature.
To end this introduction, I will relate how the news of the Reed decision
came to me. I was coming home from Rutgers the evening of November
22, 1971. Seated in a train, I saw a man reading a newspaper that had a
banner headline. It filled the entire first page of The New York Post. The
headline read, “High Court Outlaws Sex Discrimination.”4 Well, we’ll find
out if it did from our panelists. [applause].
NINA TOTENBERG: So in that regard, I just want to tell you one little
story. Last year, or the year before, there was a case at the Supreme Court
involving the strip search of a high school girl after they found an Advil on
her when there was no drugs permitted in school.5 The question was
whether this was basically excessive, whether there were some grounds for
a lawsuit. It comes to the Supreme Court. And at that point, Justice
Ginsburg was the only—I guess it’s two years ago—was the only female

2.
3.
4.
5.

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-314 (1948).
Wills and Estates, 38 U.S.L.W. 2481 (1970).
High Court Outlaws Sex Discrimination, N.Y. POST, Nov. 22, 1971, at 1.
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
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member of the Court. And without regard to ideology, all of the male
justices seemed to think this was no big deal. I remember Justice Breyer
saying he remembered people trying to stuff things in his pants and all
kinds of stuff like that in the gym and at some point, this small person to
my left lost her temper, basically. And you could almost literally—I mean,
I’m sitting there, I’m just going nuts. I suddenly look up and I see the
steam coming out of her ears. At the end of the argument, it really didn’t
look like this young woman and her mother would win a cause, the right to
sue. But as we left the press section—which these days is, I’d say, at least
half female—all of the women were saying, “What’s wrong with those
men? Are they crazy?” And p.s., of course I don’t know what went on in
the conference, but maybe they were all sufficiently humiliated by the press
accounts that it turned out that she won.
So, I want to introduce this panel and you all have biographies, so I’m
not going to waste your time with anything special here. I’m just going to
say who all these folks are. Jackie Berrien is head of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission; Earl Maltz is a professor at Rutgers
Law School; Emily Martin is the Deputy Chair of the Women’s Law
Center, pinch-hitting for Marcia Greenberger today; and Nina Pillard is a
professor at Georgetown. And, of course, any panel that has two Ninas on
it has to be good.
Each of these folks is going to speak for about five minutes. They
wanted to speak for ten, but I wouldn’t let them. Who wants to go first?
EMILY MARTIN: I think I’m first.
NINA TOTENBERG: You’re first?
EMILY MARTIN: I believe so.
NINA TOTENBERG: So there’s a batting order here?
EMILY MARTIN: There is.
NINA TOTENBERG: That’s been kept from the moderator. Okay, I’ll
let you guys go. You will not hear from me for twenty minutes.
EMILY MARTIN: Hello. My name’s Emily Martin, and as Nina
Totenberg more or less said, I’m Vice President and General Counsel at the
National Women’s Law Center, and I’m very excited to be here today to
talk about the watershed decision that was Reed v. Reed, when in a
unanimous decision, the Supreme Court for the first time in its history
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struck down a law that discriminated against women in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. And what the Court said was to give a mandatory
preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to
accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, so merely to make
things more administratively more convenient, is to make the very kind of
arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
And it’s important to realize how different this was from the cases that
had come before. The Supreme Court hadn’t heard a lot of gender
discrimination cases prior to Reed v. Reed, but those that it had heard were
very different in tone in the decisions. So, just ten years before Reed v.
Reed was decided, in Hoyt v. Florida,6 the Supreme Court had found that
there was no constitutional problem with prohibiting women from serving
on a jury unless they opted in to jury service affirmatively, which in
practice meant there were no women on juries. And the Court explained
that was because women were the seat of home and family life. And so
obviously, it made sense to have this different rule.
Basically, that holding echoed back to a Supreme Court decision almost
100 years before, Bradwell v. Illinois,7 which was under a different clause
in the Fourteenth Amendment—Myra Bradwell sought to practice law and
was denied a law license because she was a woman and said this violated
the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And
the Court there said, “No, civil law as well as nature herself has always
recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man
and woman. Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.”8 So that notion
of women being fundamentally different and creatures of the home really
survived in law in many, many ways for the century after Bradwell until
Reed v. Reed.
And Reed really represented a historic change that began to fulfill the
promise of the broad language of the Equal Protection Clause, which does
prohibit denying any person the equal protection of the law. And it is
important to recognize the Equal Protection Clause, there were
conversations about how to draft it, there were versions that would have
just prohibited discrimination on the basis of race or color or previous
condition of servitude, those were rejected in favor of the broad promise
that Reed recognized.

6. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
7. 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
8. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
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Reed recognized the arbitrariness and, thus, injustice of assuming in law
that men are more competent in regard to matters outside the home than
women. And in recognizing that, it was the seed of what becomes a very
important principle in equal protection law: gender stereotypes, the overbroad generalizations about how women are, how men are, what woman’s
role is, and what man’s role is, are inappropriate bases for legal rules that
say only men can do some things or only women can do some things.
Later cases that came in the seventies and the forty years since have
developed this jurisprudence in part by analogy to race, recognizing the
parallels between how the law historically treated women and how the law
historically treated people of color in denying them rights to serve on
juries, rights to vote, and property rights.
Through that analogy to race, which like sex is a highly visible
characteristic with very little correlation to ability to contribute to society,
through that analogy, the Supreme Court has developed intermediate
heightened scrutiny for laws that discriminate on the basis of sex. Which
means that a law that distinguishes on the basis of sex is only constitutional
if it is substantially related to an important state interest and based on an
exceedingly persuasive justification, not a gender stereotype.
The standard is generally understood to be somewhat more relaxed than
the standard of review that applies to laws that discriminate on the basis of
race, which is called strict scrutiny. However, it’s so many miles away
from where we were before Reed v. Reed, when in essence any law that
discriminated on the basis of sex was presumed to be constitutional. And
as long as any sort of rationale could be dreamed up, whether or not it was
the actual rationale that motivated the legislators, that was presumed to be a
sufficient basis for a law that distinguished between men and women.
So, in the cases that followed Reed, there were decisions that changed
the world, that led to equal treatment and government benefits, for instance,
discarding the legal presumption that the man is always the breadwinner
and the woman is always the dependent. For example, in 1975, in
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,9 another case brought by Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
the Supreme Court opened the door for thousands of widowed fathers to
receive social security benefits that before were only available to widowed
mothers of dependent children. This meant that thousands of working
mothers were able to protect their families after their death through the
benefits that they had earned by working in a way that was unavailable to
them before this decision.
Two years later in another case, Califano v. Goldfarb,10 it did away with
9. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
10. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
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the dependency test for widowers to receive social security benefits. There
had been a rule that if you were a widow, you got social security benefits.
But if you’re a widower, you had to prove that you’d actually been
dependent on your wife, on the wage earner, in order to get those benefits.
That rule was struck down, as based on gender stereotypes, in Califano v.
Goldfarb. And as a result, today tens of thousands of widowers are
awarded these benefits every year. Immediately after it was struck down,
twenty times as many widowers received those benefits, which reflected
the wage earning that their wives had done over the years.
It changed the law in public education. As a result, there have been
cases ruling that public nursing schools, state nursing schools, must be
open to men and that state military colleges must be open to women. That
neither can have single-sex admission policies based on assumptions about
what sort of education is best for one sex or the other. It led to a revolution
in control over marital property as the Court struck down laws saying the
husbands had exclusive control over jointly-owned property.
Fundamentally, it led to a change in how we think about what is
permissible and what the law can do—a change in the legal assumptions
about how gender matters to the law.
Now, not every distinction between men and women has been struck
down under the Equal Protection Clause, but it took this protection first
recognized in Reed v. Reed to reach many of these rules that today seem
archaic but were the law of the land not so very many years ago.
And so Reed and its progeny represent a strong and robust precedent.
There are many cases in the forty years since Reed, reaffirming that the
Equal Protection Clause provides heightened scrutiny to laws that
discriminate against women. But it’s important to recognize that this
conversation is not completely settled, as we’ll hear today on this very
panel. Reed was decided unanimously; less than a handful of gender equal
protection cases in the forty years since then have been decided without
dissent. And indeed, none in the past thirty years has been decided without
dissent. This area of the law remains contested with high stakes for
women, and that’s one reason why we think it’s important to talk about this
law and what it means today. So with that, I will turn to my co-panelist,
Professor Maltz.
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: A few footnotes. The quote
you heard from Bradwell v. Illinois came from a concurring opinion. The
main opinion was the soul of simplicity. It provided that the practice of
law is not a privilege or immunity of United States citizenship, or state
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citizenship.11 One of the Justices, Justice Bradley, had an expansive view
of the privileges and immunities clause, which he had just announced in
dissent in the Slaughterhouse Cases. So he had to come up with a different
reason to justify prohibiting women from practicing law. He penned the
famous line that comes just after the passage you heard. He wrote, “This is
the law of the Creator.”12 So nevermind the Constitution. It was divine
law that women should not serve as lawyers. No one ever asked Justice
Bradley by what means the law of the Creator was communicated to him.
It wasn’t mentioned in any brief.
I would like to mention just one other case, a decision that seemed to me
the epitome of the way things were in the not so good old days. The case is
titled Goesaert v. Cleary,13 it was decided in 1948. It involved a woman
who owned a tavern. Her daughter worked as her very able bartender. But
the state—Michigan—had a law that prohibited women from working as
bartenders, unless they were the wife or the daughter of the tavern owner.
The tavern owner had to be male.
The Supreme Court didn’t get it in that case. The Justices thought that
women needed to be protected from the tough guys that sometimes
frequent bars. They didn’t think about the people who were bringing the
drinks to the table. They were women—waitresses—and they were in
more danger than a person standing behind a bar. Michigan’s law put
mother and daughter Goesaert out of business with the cheers of the
bartenders’ union. That kind of thinking had absolutely nothing to do with
the ability of the mother and daughter in question. Simply because they
were women, they couldn’t be bartenders.
Emily Martin mentioned a number of cases. You heard that widowers
got the same rights that widows had enjoyed. I was involved in those cases
and some people said to me, “You’re supposed to be a women’s rights
advocate. But many of the cases that you’re bringing are about men’s
rights.” I responded, “Where does the discrimination start? Why is the
husband or the widower denied benefits? The wife who’s a wage earner is
paying the same social security taxes as her male peer, but her taxes do not
get for her family the same protection.” Yes, a man got the benefits as a
result of the Court’s decisions. But why did the law deny them to him?
Because his wage-earning working wife was not considered to be a real
worker. She was considered, at most, a pin-money earner.
Think, too, of the nursing school case, Mississippi University for Women
v. Hogan.14 The case came up during Sandra Day O’Connor’s very first
11.
12.
13.
14.

Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 139 (majority opinion).
Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
335 U.S. 464 (1948).
458 U.S. 718 (1982).
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year on the Court. Hogan was a man who wanted to attend what he
considered the best nursing school in his State, but it was closed to men.
Justice O’Connor wrote a fine opinion for the Court. Between the lines
you could glean what she understood. She knew there’s nothing better for
women in the nursing profession than to have men do that job, too. When
jobs are exclusively female, they tend to be underpaid. Justice O’Connor
thought the more men coming into the nursing profession, the better off
everyone would be.
NINA TOTENBERG: Okay, Professor Maltz?
EARL MALTZ: I just have one comment that, looking around this
room, I think it’s the tough guys in the bar who should have been worried.
In any event, I want to thank everyone, the sponsors, for the opportunity to
participate in this wonderful event. It’s really an honor to be on such a
distinguished panel. But I’m here as the official representative of the dark
side. [laughter]. I believe that Reed v. Reed was wrongly decided, and it’s
based on my general theory of constitutional interpretation rather than any
particular views about the role of women in society or the particular statute
in Idaho.
My views are based upon three basic positions. First, I am an
unrepentant originalist. I believe that in constitutional cases, judges should
be bound by the meaning that can be derived by the legal materials that
were available to those who drafted and ratified the relevant constitutional
provision. Second, I believe that in cases where the original meanings are
unclear, there should be the presumption of deference. And in case you’re
wondering, I believe that the same presumptions should be applied in cases
involving guns, property rights, affirmative action generally, and raceconscious districting.
Third, the historical record does not support the widely-shared view that
in 1866, the language of the Fourteenth Amendment would be understood
to constitutionalize open-ended notions of liberty, equality, or some similar
concept. The evidence on this point is particularly strong with respect to
the Equal Protection Clause. But unfortunately because I can’t explain that
evidence, or go through that evidence in five minutes, I’m going to—well,
no, if people are interested in talking about that evidence in the question
and answer period, I’m particularly interested in it because I have no life.
[laughter]. But I’ll be happy to discuss it during the question and answer
period.
Now, my basic view is because I think that judicial activism, which I
define as the practice of invoking the Constitution to strike down either
actions of state governments or federal legislature, carries with it
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substantial costs. First, there are the costs of uncertainty. And second,
there are the costs in terms of governmental flexibility. That is, everyone
would agree that the government shouldn’t be allowed to do certain things;
to take a clear example that I think everyone in the room would agree with,
the government should not be allowed to legalize slavery. But I think also
we would agree in general that the government needs to have flexibility to
adapt to changing conditions. Basically, what invoking the Constitution
against particular kinds of practices does is to deprive the government of
that flexibility.
Now at this point, I’m going to have to talk real fast. Originalist
activism is not based upon a consequentialist analysis like this. It’s based
upon a purely formal idea that, basically, the courts are supposed to follow
the Constitution for the same reason that they follow statutes. And that’s
what originalist activism is based on. But in contrast to originalist
activism, the basic justification for non-originalist activism is entirely
instrumental. That is, at least implicitly, that is the idea that at least in the
long run, society will be better off if judges feel more or less free to enforce
some set of values based on general ideas such as liberty, equality, or rights
that are deeply rooted in our history and tradition, even if the framers had
no way of knowing that the language would be interpreted that way.
Now, one of the problems in evaluating this is each of us, if we could all
say, “I don’t like this law, I don’t like that law, therefore, the Court should
strike it down,” that would be easy. If I were king of the world, we would
do that. If I were on the Court, I guess the address to write is 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue. But the problem is we can’t do that. We can’t
know in advance what the ideology of judges are likely to be, and the same
kind of philosophy that supports—in terms of judicial philosophy rather
than political philosophy—decisions like Reed v. Reed also supports
decisions like Cronson15 and such that are anathema to progressives.
Now against this background, I suspect the affinity that many
progressives apparently have for non-originalist activism is something of a
hangover from the Chief Justiceships of Earl Warren and Warren Burger—
under Earl Warren where activism is invariably invoked in favor of
progressive causes, and under Warren Burger, I think the cases of
conservative activism were dwarfed by the liberal activism of cases such as
Roe v. Wade.16 And even the far more conservative Rehnquist and
Roberts’ courts have produced signal victories for progressives such as
United States v. Virginia,17 Lawrence v. Texas,18 and Boumediene v. Bush,19
15.
16.
17.
18.

Cronson v. Clark, 810 F.2d 662 (7th Cir. 1987).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
518 U.S. 515 (1996).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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apparently creating the impression among some progressive commentators
that, in the long run, non-originalist activism will have an inherent bias
toward the left.
For my progressive friends, I have a message. From your perspective,
non-originalist activism could easily have produced much worse results.
One need only imagine a world in which the first George Bush, or as I refer
to him George I, had selected a nominee whose ideology was a little less
stealthy than David Souter. The only thing that one can say for sure is that
non-originalist activist decisions will be a lagging indicator of the political
perspective of whatever portion of the legal and political elite that
dominates the Court at some particular time. One can have no assurance
that the cumulative effect of those decisions will be positive in any
meaningful sense.
With the benefits thus uncertain and the costs clear, if I ruled the
world—now there’s a grizzly thought—I would not have judicial review at
all. But because we have a written constitution, we’re likely to accept nonoriginalist activism in clear cases. Beyond that, I would leave the state
governments and other branches of the federal government the flexibility
necessary to do their jobs. I concede I would lose the benefits of cases
such as Reed and its progeny. But on the other hand, progressives would
not be stuck with decisions such as, for example, Citizens United.20 You
know, it’s one of those things where you pay your money, you take your
chances, and in the immortal words of The Who, “[P]ray we won’t get
fooled again.”21 Thank you.
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: Nina, just a few comments.
One is, did the Court spark resentment, resistance in Congress as a result of
the decision in Reed v. Reed? Quite the contrary. What followed was a
conversation between the Court and the Legislature. In the wake of Reed,
hundreds of laws, state and federal, were changed. Congress went through
all of the provisions of the U.S. Code and changed almost all that classified
overtly on the basis of gender. So Congress and the Court were in sync.
I have a different originalist view. I count myself an originalist, too, but
in a quite different way than Professor Maltz. Equality was the motivating
idea, it was the idea enshrined in the Declaration of Independence. But
equality was not mentioned in the original Constitution. Why? Because
the odious practice of slavery was retained. So the equality principle does
not appear in the Constitution until after the Civil War, when the
19. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
20. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
21. THE WHO, Won’t Get Fooled Again, on WHO’S NEXT (Decca Records & Track

Records 1971).
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Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.
The genius of the United States has been its growth capacity. Recall that
“We, the People,”22 were once white, property-owning men. That concept,
“We, the People,” has become ever more embracive. Native Americans
were originally not part of “We, the People,” nor were people held in
human bondage, women, newcomers to our shores. Today, “We, the
People,” has a marvelous diversity, wholly absent in the beginning.
Was women’s equality so far from the minds of the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment? I don’t think so in this sense. What they were
getting at basically—you’ll find this cropping up again and again in the
legislative record—they were against caste. They did not want the United
States to have any classes or castes that would identify people by their birth
status. They referred to the situation in India a number of times. What
they didn’t want was castes in the U.S.A.
On the other hand, they surely did not consider women equal citizens.
After all, women didn’t have what was the most basic right, the right to
vote, until ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. So I
recommend to you a recent article by a professor who counts himself an
originalist, Steven Calabresi of Northwestern.23 He explains that when
women got the right to vote, that ended the possibility of leaving them out
of the equality norm. The Fourteenth Amendment was sparked by the idea
that there should be no castes. Its framers didn’t understand that the legal
status of women resembled a caste system. But when women were made
full citizens, when they gained the right to vote, then, they were embraced
as equals within the Fourteenth Amendment.
NINA TOTENBERG: Ms. Berrien?
JACQUELINE BERRIEN: Thank you so much. I will take a little of
the time that I have to note that this is not only recognition of an important
anniversary but also an event that has been organized to attract and to
involve students from across the city in the various law schools, and I
would be remiss if I didn’t say what a tremendous opportunity it is to be a
part of this discussion, this historic discussion. Justice Ginsburg, I have
been privileged over my career to see you at work on the bench, and I
fortunately began my career when Justice Marshall was still sitting on the
bench. And I have been privileged to work for both the ACLU Women’s
Rights Project, which Justice Ginsburg founded, and the NAACP Legal

22. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
23. Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90

TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011).
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Defense Fund, which Justice Marshall founded, so the connection between
being a part of this discussion today and the things that I dreamed of doing
when I was a student is something I want to note particularly for the
students who are part of this audience today.
I am a bit of an outlier in this discussion in this sense: I’m not going to
focus on the Constitution and the constitutional standards, the professors
will be focusing on those issues. But I want to talk a bit about the role of
the federal statutes and the federal enforcement structure that I am now
responsible for leading at the EEOC. And Justice Ginsburg’s remarks
actually are a terrific segue to what I’d like to focus on.
As the Justice said, Reed v. Reed opened important doors in terms of the
constitutional analysis that applied to sex-based classifications in the law.
But at the same time—and really I would say almost as bookends to what
was happening in the courts in terms of constitutional litigation—Congress
passed a range of statutes that were also addressing inequality and
discrimination of various kinds. And in some instances, the statutes were
ahead of court decisions in terms of recognizing and protecting rights, and
in other instances the statutes followed important court decisions like Reed
v. Reed, as the Justice noted.
So the importance of Reed, I think, is properly discussed alongside the
significance of the whole range of statutes that Congress enacted and that
the courts have interpreted over the years. The Constitution and statutes
have operated together to advance women’s rights in the workplace, and in
other spheres of life as well.
The EEOC was created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964,24 which
recognized women’s right to work free from various forms of sex
discrimination. The Equal Pay Act25 was passed a year before the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and initially was enforced by the Department of Labor.
It was related to the Fair Labor Standards Act,26 which is the federal law
that ensures that people who are working for pay receive the pay they’re
entitled to. And the Equal Pay Act ensured that you could not be paid less
or be compensated differently for equal work based on your sex.
In 1964, Title VII prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of
race, color, sex, national origin, and religion and also prohibited
discrimination in retaliation for exercising any rights under that statute.
The EEOC has enforced that law for the last forty-six years. We also
24. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
25. Equal Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 29 U.S.C. (2006)).
26. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2006)).
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enforce the Equal Pay Act today.
We enforce the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act,27 which was passed by Congress in 1978 after two
Supreme Court decisions called into question whether Title VII’s
prohibition on sex discrimination meant that employers could not
discriminate on the basis of pregnancy. We also enforce the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act,28 the Americans with Disabilities
Act,29 and the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act.30
And I mention those because one of the real hallmarks of our
enforcement responsibility and reach today is that we not only enforce laws
that obviously and directly relate to discrimination on the basis of sex, we
also enforce laws that address other forms of discrimination that impact
women, and as a result we must be mindful that workplace discrimination
can occur in intersecting ways. When a woman comes to us for assistance,
we have to consider if more than one of the laws that we enforce might
apply to her, and if her rights in the workplace and the remedies available
to her are based upon multiple statutes. For example, a woman with a
family history of breast cancer who seeks assistance from us today could be
simultaneously protected by Title VII and the Genetic Information NonDiscrimination Act, depending upon the specific facts of her case. We
recognize that sex discrimination could be just one of the barriers to
workplace advancement that a woman might encounter, and our outreach,
public education, enforcement and litigation reflect awareness of the
possibility of “intersectional” discrimination.
So there’s no question that when you think about Reed v. Reed and
what’s different in the workplace and what’s different for working women
today, clearly the constitutional standards are critical. But the statutes that
were passed alongside, and as bookends to constitutional decisions like
Reed are also critical and have played an important role in improving the
quality of life and opening doors to a broader array of opportunities for
working women and men.
NINA TOTENBERG: That leaves you, Nina.
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: Now, just—okay.

27. Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
28. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat.
602 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2006)).
29. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
30. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122
Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2006)).
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NINA TOTENBERG: Originally, I thought you were going to come at
the end, so okay. Go for it.
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: I’ll also come at the end.
[laughter]. Title VII in ‘64, now that’s seven years before Reed, how did
women get there? Title VII was originally for race, national origin,
religion. And then a congressman from Virginia who wanted to defeat the
measure said, “Well, women are discriminated against too, so why not put
sex in there?” He thought adding sex would help to defeat the entire Title
VII. Instead, sex came in by floor amendment and it stayed.
In the same year Reed v. Reed was decided, the first ever Title VII
gender discrimination case came before the Court. It was a case called
Phillips v. Martin Marietta.31 Ida Phillips was a woman who wanted to
work for Martin Marietta. She was a waitress and she knew that the pay
was better at Martin Marietta. But the company had a rule. It was, “We do
not hire mothers of preschool children.” Fathers, of course, are welcome.
A sex discrimination case was supported by the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund. Why? Ida Phillips was a white woman. But the NAACP lawyers
realized what a tremendous benefit a victory for Phillips could be for
women of color, women in the same situation, women who had children,
preschool children, and wanted the best paying job they could get. There’s
been a symbiotic relationship between race and sex, race discrimination
cases under Title VII have been used as precedent for sex discrimination
cases, and the other way around.
The Supreme Court said that Martin Marietta could not say flat out, “We
don’t hire women with preschool children.” But the majority suggested
that perhaps, if the employer could prove that having preschool children
demonstratively affected women more than men, then maybe sex would be
a so-called bona fide occupational classification.
Justice Thurgood Marshall, in a concurring opinion, said forget bona fide
occupational classification.32 The Court appeared to be falling for the
ancient canard Title VII should end—the notion that women are more
responsible for children than men are, so women should be kept from the
best jobs.
NINA TOTENBERG: I should say that I was at that argument, the
Martin Marietta argument and I remember two questions that tell you how
much times have changed. I think it was Chief Justice Burger who said,
“Well, there are certain skills that women have that are better for men. For
31. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
32. Id. at 544-47 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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example, they’re the best typists.” Of course, it turned out that the fastest
typist in the world was a man. And then I think it was Justice Stewart who
said, “Well, you wouldn’t expect men to be stewardesses, would you?”
[laughter]. They were different times, what can I say? Okay, Nina Pillard?
NINA PILLARD: Thank you, Nina, and thank you to all of you for
being here. Thank you to the National Women’s Law Center and the
cosponsors, fellow panelists and Supreme Court oralist Allen Derr. But
especially thank you, Justice Ginsburg, for honoring us by being here today
and for assisting us by being there in that day, in 1971. It’s just really
moving to be part of this with you.
So I want to make three points. I want to elaborate a little bit on what
the principle is that’s at the core of the Reed v. Reed doctrine as it’s been
carried forth in the sex discrimination equal protection cases. And that’s
this principle against stereotyping, or as it’s even more accurately been
articulated by Justice Ginsburg in Virginia Military Institute,33 a principle
against over-generalization based on sex. And I want to talk a little bit
about the impact of Reed v. Reed on Congress’s power to legislate. And
finally, if I have time, make a few comments about constitutional
interpretation in response to Professor Maltz.
One thing that strikes me about this case, though, just hearing the Justice
recount the story of Sally Reed is how it was a tiny thing, in a way, that she
stood up for. Being the administrator of her son’s estate, it was a few
hundred dollars and one way or another, it was probably going to be
administered the same way. But as the Justice said, she had a sentimental
attachment to the idea of tending to her son’s business in this way. It just
makes me think so often, and I think in some ways increasingly, we think,
“Oh, don’t make a federal case out of it. Don’t fuss over things that we can
just be generous and let roll.” And I think those of you who are parents,
this comes up constantly when you’re navigating if there’s a co-parent on
the scene. “Oh, should I just make a deal out of this or not?” And those
are things that are very fraught with equality implications. And I just want
to sort of remark that we’re so fortunate that Sally Reed did make a big
deal out of this and that these really small issues in the real world add up to
and reinforce really major principles that really transform our lives.
So, what Reed v. Reed characterized as arbitrary was this notion that men
would be better administrators. And we now know that sex-based
classifications in the law are subject to heightened scrutiny, intermediate or
skeptical scrutiny. But when the Court decided Reed, it didn’t actually
adopt any new level of scrutiny. It purported to be applying rational basis
33. Va. Military Inst. v. United States, 508 U.S. 946 (1993).
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review. Of course, looking at it in hindsight we know that just the kinds of
rationales that were brought forward by the state—that generally men
would be more comfortable with administering an estate—are the kinds of
things that would be fine under rational basis review, but that the higher
level of scrutiny really digs into and rejects.
So we see in Reed the seeds of this opposition to reliance on over-broad,
sex-based generalizations. So when we see people concluding in policy or
in law that there needs to be a line between the treatment of men and the
treatment of women because men are a certain way or women like certain
things, or don’t like certain things, that’s the thing that raises the
constitutional red flag under equal protection. And the thing that’s sort of
distinctive about this is that, even if government action is done without any
invidious motive, any kind of anti-woman bigotry or any real effort to
denigrate women or men in any regard, it’s the over-generalization that is
seen as driving the harm.
And in fact, one of the things that was sort of tricky at the beginning of
sex discrimination, both statutory law and constitutional law, was this sense
that nobody means any harm. And so there’s a way in which the overgeneralization principle gives us a way of rooting out the kind of lazy or
unnecessary reliance on sex as a criterion, when other more relevant
criteria are available.
And Reed is very alive. There was a case just last term, the FloresVillar34 case, in which the Court of Appeals had sustained a sex-based
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act.35 And that case was
actually the lower court opinion upholding this sex-based distinction and
was affirmed by an equally divided court four-four. And the ninth justice
was Elena Kagan. And because she had dealt with this issue as Solicitor
General, she recused herself. So you see how important the latest
appointment to the Court is. That when she logs in on this issue, she’s
going to be the tiebreaker.
Just a couple of words about congressional power. On the face of Reed
v. Reed, and in its most immediate and direct applications, it’s about
constraining governmental action. If the statute at the state level or at the
federal level uses this sex-based classification, Reed v. Reed says we’re
going to look at that and maybe reject it. But a less obvious implication of
Reed that’s just as important is that it empowers government to work
against sex discrimination. It is the basis on which Title VII and the many
laws that the EEOC, under Jackie Berrien’s leadership, the basis on which
those laws can be applied to state employer, notwithstanding the states’
34. Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011).
35. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965)

(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2006)).
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sovereign immunity from Commerce Clause legislation. So there’s a way
in which it’s because there’s special heightened scrutiny for sex
discrimination that Congress has the power to use the strong tools to go out
and eradicate sex discrimination.
There was a case called Nevada v. Hibbs,36 which sustained as anti-sex
discrimination legislation, the Family and Medical Leave Act.37 And that
case was decided by a court after a line of cases that had invalidated other
laws. There was a case invalidating provisions of the Age Act and a case
invalidating provisions of the Disabilities in Employment Act because
Congress wasn’t thought to have the power to apply those laws, at least to
state employees.
The reason why the Family and Medical Leave Act was sustained and
why Title VII also applies, the 1964 act also applies to state employers, is
because of the Reed principle, because of the greater constitutional scrutiny
that’s given to classifications that are based on sex. So when you’re talking
about kind of institutional competence and whether it should be Congress
or whether it should be the Court, it’s important to know that the fate of the
two powers, the judicial power to enforce equality and the congressional
power to act and enforce equality, are very linked and really go back to
their roots in Reed.
And just a couple of comments about originalism. You know, we’re all
originalists to the extent that we all consider ourselves to be bound by the
Constitution. But, what Professor Maltz so ably argued is a view that I
don’t share, and I think shouldn’t be applied to the Equal Protection
Clause. He said, among other things, the Framers had no way of knowing
the Equal Protection Clause would be interpreted in the way it was in Reed.
And I would say that at some level, that’s true, they had no way of knowing
we’d have iPhones today. But they did anticipate the kind of change that
we’ve seen in a broad sense. The language of the Equal Protection Clause
is broad; it’s pitched at a high level of generality, and purposely so. The
Framers wrote the most important provisions of the Constitution generally
because they anticipated that, over time, new circumstances would demand
that we take these general principles and apply them to new facts.
And our Constitution did not have to be a broad brush in that way.
There are plenty of state constitutions and constitutions of other nations
that are written much more precisely and are much more frequently
amended. But the choice of the broad terms is really an invitation to the
kind of common law case-by-case interpretation that the courts engaged in.

36. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
37. Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as

amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2006)).
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NINA TOTENBERG: Justice Ginsburg?
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: One point about Nevada v.
Hibbs, which upheld against constitutional challenge the family leave
provisions of the Family Medical and Leave Act. As one lives, one learns.
Recall the author of the opinion, the Title VII opinion, in Gilbert v.
General Electric,38 holding that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is
not discrimination on the basis of sex. That same Justice, my later Chief,
wrote the opinion for the Court in Hibbs upholding the relevant provisions
of the Family Medical and Leave Act. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained
why it was important that this leave be given to men as well as women,
because men are, or should be, caretakers of the family as women are. In
fact, when I brought the opinion home to my dear husband, the opinion in
Nevada v. Hibbs, he said, “Ruth, did you write that?” [laughter].
NINA TOTENBERG: So when you said he lived and learned, do you
suppose that might have had something to do with the fact that he had a
daughter?
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: Maybe even more, he had
granddaughters.
NINA TOTENBERG: That’s true. So, I’m going to ask a couple of
questions first to the whole panel, and I’m also going to urge the panelists
to ask each other some questions. My broad question for the whole panel,
as somebody who has fortunately lived through this revolution, is we are
celebrating the anniversary of Reed v. Reed, but do you really think that
there now are so many statutes protecting women’s rights that would it
matter terribly if, now, there weren’t Reed v. Reed? There’s employment
pay, all kinds of statutes that protect women’s rights. And the women
sitting in this room are a sort of testament to that. So, if tomorrow there
weren’t Reed v. Reed there, would it make a huge difference? Even
assuming that everything stays as it is, does it matter that we don’t have
strict scrutiny as opposed to heightened scrutiny? Haven’t we ended up, in
some sense, almost in the same position? Jackie?
JACQUELINE BERRIEN: Well, I think Nina actually made the point
very well. I don’t think it’s an either/or. I think that the statutes and the
constitutional standards are very symbiotic and that the authority that
Congress has in its perception, and really the public perception, the public
38. Gen. Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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that elects those members of Congress and its belief about whether
Congress has not just the authority but I’ll say the responsibility to act to
address conditions that it finds in society. And that it is rooted in
constitutional principles, I think is significant in our structure of
government, in the system in which we live. And I think that’s exactly
why the organizations like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the ACLU
Women’s Rights Project focused not only on how the statutes would be
interpreted, but also ultimately on what the constitutional underpinning for
those statutes would be. Clearly, the statutes have made in terms of real
application of the Constitution a tremendous, tremendous difference in
every way.
Title IX is another great example. It’s not a part of the Civil Rights Act.
But Title IX, which removed many of the barriers to women’s
participation, women and girls participation in sports and educational
opportunities, has made a tremendous difference. But the fact that
Congress acts, and that the public understands that Congress acts, based on
an understanding of what the Constitution requires for all of the people of
the nation is significant. And that is what the Fourteenth Amendment is
about, is protection for the people.
NINA TOTENBERG: Professor Maltz?
EARL MALTZ: I’d just like to observe one thing about that,
specifically in connection to Reed v. Reed. It’s not an accident that Reed v.
Reed was decided unanimously in 1971 because, and I know a few years
before that in my mind is—I’m just getting old—that it was an almost
unanimous Congress. I know it wasn’t exactly unanimous, but an
overwhelming majority of Congress had proposed the Equal Rights
Amendment. So my point about that in terms of my basic constitutional
theory rap is that the reason it was unanimous is that it reflected basically
the views of the governing elites of the time, both liberal and conservative.
And as we see those views change for a variety of different reasons, we see
a different change dynamic on the Court. And that’s all I have to say about
that.
NINA TOTENBERG: Emily?
EMILY MARTIN: Well, I think it would make a difference. One
reason is the reason that Nina Pillard talked about briefly, in that it makes a
real difference as far as what laws Congress can pass, not just the very
important symbolic foundational principle that the United States is a
country in which men and women are equal before the law, which is
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incredibly important. But also in real terms whether when Congress passes
a law against discrimination, it applies to state governments and how they
treat their employees, or if it’s state run public housing, how they treat their
tenants. Whether Congress has the authority to tell state governments,
“You can’t discriminate against women” really depends upon the
heightened scrutiny of sex discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause
permits. So in that way, it has an immediate concrete effect, even if we
assume that statutory protections are strong and at this point not going to go
away.
But it’s also the case that while we do have very strong and important
statutory protections in Title VII and Title XI and the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act and the Fair Housing Act against sex discrimination
that it doesn’t cover the waterfront. I also am very proud to say that I was a
litigator at the ACLU Women’s Rights Project for many years, and we
brought equal protection cases because sometimes you need the
Constitution. Sometimes, the Constitution doesn’t reach the question that
you are talking about.
Take a small example, one of the equal protection cases we brought was
one about softball fields versus baseball fields in a municipality in
Oregon.39 And the girls’ softball fields were terribly run down, and the
boys literally had a stadium. And because it was municipal fields, it wasn’t
a school, Title XI didn’t reach it. There’s no law that says that you can’t
treat boys far better in your municipal athletics program than girls in your
municipal athletics program except the Constitution. And it’s a small case,
but it’s an important principle, that sometimes you need that foundational
rule, that foundational law that we treat people fairly here to reach
inequities. So I think the importance of Reed v. Reed lives on in many
ways.
NINA PILLARD: I mean, the way that I see it is without Reed, there
would be nothing wrong under the Constitution with states using sex-based
generalizations. For example, about men’s and women’s different work
and family roles. And they could use those generalizations to drive policies
about, well, let’s not really give leave to men because it’s really women
who need it, I mean, generally, on average. And let’s not give these
challenging jobs to women because, I mean generally, typically on average,
women are going to have babies and they’re going to run home and not
really be as committed to the workforce.
39. See Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Seeks ‘Level Playing Field’ for City
Sponsored Girls’ Softball League in Oregon (Apr. 4, 2002), http://www.aclu.org/
womens-rights/aclu-seeks-level-playing-field-city-sponsored-girls-softball-leagueoregon.
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I mean, those are the over-generalizations that although true in some
factual, general sense, are the very thing that we use this constitutional test
to sort of discipline. And if we really lived in a world in which we didn’t
have any constitutional rule against that kind of over-generalization, then
we would disadvantage the atypical people who really are the spearhead of
social change on gender roles. And what do I mean by that? The law
stands out and protects someone who wants to be the stay-at-home dad,
even though he’s atypical. If you didn’t have the rule against overgeneralizations, and if you had policies that were driven by what women
and the men generally want, you wouldn’t have protection for him.
The woman who decides she wants to run for President. It’s part of our
attitudes, it is part of our constitutional law, that even though typically,
maybe, people of one gender or another don’t want to do these things, that
we want to privilege the atypical, we want to see how far genders can go
out of our kind of more majoritarian, more conventional impulses. I was
thinking about this panel, and I was thinking about forty years ago and
when I was about a little younger than my daughter is today, and I was
thinking about how much more athletic opportunity kids have and how they
do things in sports that we thought women were physically incapable of
doing. And that is because we’ve tested ourselves, our own impulses in
part with the help of this Reed principle.
NINA TOTENBERG: Before that little voice says to me, “Nina?”
[laughter]. Do you have anything you want to say? You can pass if you
want to.
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: Why 1971? Why was that
the year? Professor Maltz referred to the governing elites that sent out the
Equal Rights Amendment for ratification. I think the idea started with the
people. There was, at the start of the seventies, a burgeoning women’s
rights movement, a revival of the women’s rights movement not only in the
United States, but all over the world. As a great professor of constitutional
law, Professor Paul Freund, famously said, “The Supreme Court should not
be affected by the weather of the day. But inevitably, the Court will be
affected by the climate of the era.”40 The climate of the era, I think, was
responsible for the different responses the Supreme Court gave in 1961 and
in 1971. In 1961, the liberal Warren Court said it was okay not to put
women on jury rolls. The not so liberal Burger Court said it’s not okay to
exclude Sally Reed from being an administrator of an estate. So it was the
40. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as a
Means of Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 263, 268 (1997).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol20/iss2/1

22

et al.: Reed v. Reed at 40: Equal Protection and Women's Rights

2012]

REED V. REED AT 40

337

movement in society for change. It has to start with the people. And if it
doesn’t, then nothing’s going to happen in government circles.
Yes, the people’s elected representatives can take account of the climate
of the era. That’s their job. But remember that after World War II,
constitutional courts were created in a number of European countries to
rule definitively on constitutional questions, including questions involving
basic human rights. Why? Because Europe had seen that popularly elected
legislatures cannot always be trusted to keep society in tune with its most
basic values.
So a detached, impartial, removal-proof body, a
constitutional court, would help to ensure against a return to the kind of
autocratic governments that did not respect human dignity.
The idea of a court performing this role, the role of reviewing legislative
and executive acts for constitutionality, really took off after World War II.
It did so in the wake of a most virulent brand of racism, to which good
people said, “Never again.”
NINA TOTENBERG: You know, it’s very interesting to me, I’m doing
something that I—for those of you who haven’t done it—suggest you do it,
and that is read Jeff Shesol’s book called Supreme Power,41 which is about
the Roosevelt court-packing plan. And many of the ideas, for example, that
we hear out of Newt Gingrich’s mouth today, were coming out of the
mouth of Franklin Roosevelt then. And it is just really fascinating to see
the shoe on the other foot in a different era and to see the Court in the
middle. And in the case of the court-packing plan, the Court actually did
start to change because of the climate of the era, you could argue. But it’s
worth thinking about and remembering.
Professor Maltz, I wanted to ask you one question and you’re really to be
commended. To come to an event like this and be the—
EARL MALTZ: I’m used to it. [laughter].
NINA TOTENBERG: Be the pincushion, as it were, for everybody
here almost, is that—but I did want to ask you one thing. And that is if you
look at the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and their intent and what
I thought as a young reporter just reading the briefs, you would have to say,
though, that the Court was wrong in Brown,42 too, because certainly the
Court did not envision integrated schools in the District of Columbia. This
was a sleepy southern city in which they were very much segregated, and
that wasn’t contemplated at the time. In fact, education was even
41. JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER (2010).
42. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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somewhat different at the time.
EARL MALTZ: Yes. Look, can I just say a couple of things?
NINA TOTENBERG: You can say anything you want.
EARL MALTZ: Really? [laughter]. I want to start, if I can, with
talking about what Justice Ginsburg and what Nina said about, other Nina,
said about the language of the Equal Protection Clause.
NINA TOTENBERG: That may be the only time in your life you ever
get called “the other Nina.”
EARL MALTZ: Long story, I’m going to have to make it really short.
It’s not about protection of equal laws, it’s about equal protection of the
laws. And, as I say, I’m going to have to make it really—a complicated
story made really—short. There actually was something called the right to
protection of the laws that was in Chancellor Kent, one of my friends,
among other people, well established, prior to 1866. And the rest of the
problem is about the evidence. Is that in fact, one of the things they were
really concerned about was federalism and there was an earlier version of
the amendment, which talked about giving Congress the authority to
enforce equal protection of life, liberty, and property. And it was defeated
and every Republican who spoke against that amendment, that language,
specifically complained about the fact that it was open-ended.
And so to me, the evidence says we moved from this equal protection of
life, liberty, and property, to equal protection of the laws. As I say, it’s a
long story, I’m sorry.
NINA TOTENBERG: It’s clear.
EARL MALTZ: No, you’re not sorry I don’t go on longer about that, I
assure you. About Brown, yeah, you’re right. Can’t get there. I’m willing
to say I can’t—a lot of people have tried to get there, can’t get there. And
for a lot of people, that’s sort of the end of the debate. But it’s sort of like
it seems to me, still, that there is—now, if I were in a different group, a
very different group, a group of committed pro-life people—I doubt that
there are a lot of committed pro-life people in this room, there might be
some—they would say, “Yeah, but there’s also Roe,” which they see—
now, I understand that that viewpoint is foreign to most people in this
room, but if you were a very committed pro-life person you would see—
Roe as basically constitutionalizing a really, really, really bad value.
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And my point about that is all you can say is that over time, it gets back
to my basic thing about what is described as judicial activism generally, but
in particular what I describe as non-originalist or sometimes neo-originalist
activism. That what you are going to get is basically a lagging indicator of
the views of a particular group—the pejorative term would be the
“governing elite”—but basically the powerful people in the country who
appoint people and are appointed to the Court.
And since in my view, I know Keynes said “In the long run, we are all
dead,”43 that in the long run, I don’t think that there is actually evidence in
the long run that what I describe as judicial activism, has advanced society
generally. Again, the Warren Court is something of an anomaly. And I
think that there are costs. And so I understand that I am sort of against the
tide not only in this world, but the tide of world opinion or whatever about
constitutional courts, but that’s my story and I’m sticking to it.
NINA TOTENBERG: Well, I guess we know he’s not going to be
nominated to the Supreme Court.
EARL MALTZ: Not this year.
NINA TOTENBERG: Not for a while. [laughter]. Yes?
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: Brown was a tremendously
important decision, but it’s not the decision that ended apartheid in
America. That decision didn’t come until twelve years later. The case was
Loving v. Virginia,44 its target was miscegenation laws. The law said, in
effect, there is a lower caste and the dominant race is not to be made
impure by mixing with the lower caste. I don’t know, Professor Maltz,
what you would say about miscegenation laws which several of our . . .
EARL MALTZ: I’m against them.
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: . . .Yes, of course you are.
But would you have decided Loving v.Virginia differently?
EARL MALTZ: Would I have decided Loving v. Virginia differently?
Well, I could sort of dodge and say that—there’s a complicated relationship
between theories of precedent and theories of originalism—I can say, “Oh
look at Brown.” I guess I’m going to have to admit that I think it’s very
43. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923).
44. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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difficult to get to most of the Warren Court decisions about segregation and
miscegenation and such was an originalist theory. Can some people say,
“Oh, that’s easy for you to say? Here he is, a privileged white male.” But,
it is what it is.
NINA TOTENBERG: Jackie, could I ask you about—we have been
talking a great deal about women. I’m wondering how much there is of
discrimination against men that comes to the EEOC? And other kinds of
discrimination that most people don’t think of, frankly?
JACQUELINE BERRIEN: Sure. Well, I think it’s important to
remember that what Title VII prohibits is discrimination on the basis of
sex. So it does not apply only to women, by any means. And just as
Justice Ginsburg mentioned earlier, the first case the Supreme Court
decided under Title VII and its sex discrimination provision, was argued by
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and it wasn’t obvious, perhaps, to some
why that made sense. But one of the reasons was that the Fund also
recognized that the way that Title VII was interpreted would impact
everyone who was protected by Title VII. And that went beyond the
immediate facts of the specific case.
And I should mention that the person who argued that case is an EEOC
alum, Bill Robinson, and is also affiliated with the D.C. School of Law
represented here today.
Ultimately, we do continue to see a full range of cases brought by men
and women that are challenging various forms of sex discrimination. We
get harassment cases, for example, that involve men who have been
harassed either by other men, more often by other men in the workplace.
We have resolved those both in court and in out-of-court settlements. As
several people have mentioned today, the principles that have supported
things like the Family Medical Leave Act, certainly as we interpret and
apply not only Title VII but also the related statutes like the Family
Medical Leave Act, what’s important is not whether the person who brings
the case is a man or a woman. What’s important is whether there is
discrimination in granting leave or in a term of condition of employment
that is prohibited by the law.
And certainly we have, for example, equal pay cases that are brought not
only by women but by men of various races. I would be remiss if I didn’t
say here, as I sit here as the African American woman on this panel, that
part of the discussion—and perhaps it’s inevitable because of the different
standards under the constitutional interpretation of the Court—part of the
discussion has proceeded under a construct that women have no race, or
that people of color have no sex. And obviously, neither of those things are
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true.
And it’s also true in terms of the EEOC and its enforcement
responsibility that we see people workers, both male and female, who are
coming to us with a range of complaints or range of concerns about
conditions in the workplace. So, for example, when we had a meeting
earlier in the year about the issue of how people who are unemployed are
treated in job announcements, whether announcements and other efforts by
employers to recruit employees can exclude the unemployed. One of the
people who testified was Fatima Goss Graves from the National Women’s
Law Center, and she was able to talk about the impact of that policy on
women. It may not have been intuitive to some that there might be
different aspects of how that policy might affect women.
And she was able to talk about, for example, for some women caregiving leave may be the reason that they are unemployed at the time they’re
seeking employment. So the assumption that a person who’s unemployed
may be less qualified for particular work would be not only invalid, but
would effectively impact them on the basis of their care-giving
responsibilities and sex.
So really, I would say that now we are committed to looking at any
policy that comes before us, any claim, and being sure that while there may
be an obvious ground that we’re not only looking at it from the standpoint
that may first, or immediately, present itself and that we really look at a
broad range of issues that might affect different people in the workplace in
different ways.
The Center last week, exactly a week ago, recognized women who were
part of the Freedom Rider Movement, and it was a tremendous, tremendous
recognition. And I think it is an appropriate thing to happen in the same
month that the Center is recognizing this anniversary of Reed. Because the
truth is that both in court and out of court, it’s been action that a lot of
people, many of them ordinary people, as you heard today, about the
people who were involved in the Reed case, the people who made a
difference, the women who made a difference in the Freedom Rides; those
are the people who in many ways have stepped up to open the doors. And
while the constitutional standards and decisions are things that live with us
and are an important legacy, it’s certainly true that as Nina Pillard said
earlier, those people’s willingness to come forward are a critically
important part of how I know I sit here today with the opportunities that are
available to me and the commitment that I feel today to continue to broaden
those opportunities for other girls and women who come behind me, as
well as men and boys.
NINA TOTENBERG: So, I wanted to leave a few minutes to take some
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questions from the audience before we—believe it or not, we’ve eaten up
an hour and twenty-one minutes. It doesn’t seem that long at all. So let me
just ask for a few questions. Yes, over here? Hold on a second, I think
somebody’s got a microphone.
AUDIENCE: I have a question about the separate standard—the
intermediate scrutiny for sex discrimination. I was wondering what the
Court’s rationale was for deciding on the separate standard? Do you think
it’s rightly decided, and what effect does this have on cases where there is
an intersection between, for instance, race and sex?
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: Examples work more forcibly
on the mind than precepts. I wonder about law schools that teach you there
are three tiers; there’s rational basis; then there’s intermediate scrutiny;
and, finally, there’s suspect classification. My counsel would be, watch
what the Court does more than what it says. In Reed, the Court purported
to use the lowest tier—rational basis review. And yet, a unanimous court
struck down an overt sex-based classification.
I like the expressions, heightened scrutiny, skeptical scrutiny, and
exceedingly persuasive justification. Does it make any difference that
those are used words. Remember the birth of the strict scrutiny standard.
The Supreme Court first enunciated that standard in a case called
Korematsu.45 The Court’s decision justified detaining people on the basis
of their race and national origin, justified rounding them up and putting
them in detention camps for the duration of World War II. Strict scrutiny
was the standard, but the result today, I think—whatever the standard
invoked—would be government cannot do that.
NINA TOTENBERG: In other words, watch what we do, not what we
say. Nina Pillard?
NINA PILLARD: I was just going to add, I think that the Justice is
exactly right. There are rational basis cases like Reed that are rational
basis, arguably, with teeth. There are intermediate scrutiny cases like the
Virginia Military Institute case that really sound like strict scrutiny cases
and use a different formulation, skeptical scrutiny. So I think there’s really
a range of different ways in which the courts confront specific scenarios
and test them and try to use a form of analysis that’s going to root out
harmful discrimination.
I think just the short answer to the first part of your question, why was it
45. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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intermediate? I think at the time that analysis was adopted, it was thought
that there were probably a bunch of kinds of sex-based classifications that
would be okay more so than race-based classifications. And one thing that
we’ve seen is that the more experience we have with sex equality, the
harder it is to really see where men need to be excluded or women need to
be excluded and where roles need to be assigned based on sex.
And so the standard, I think, has sort of drifted toward a strict scrutiny
standard in practice because the practice that we have, the experience that
we have, makes us more confident that full equality is going to work.
NINA TOTENBERG: Anybody else? Yes?
AUDIENCE: So the strip search of the high school girl case was
mentioned, but in cases that are less obviously about gender explicitly,
what do you think the effect of the genders of the justices has on their
decisions?
NINA TOTENBERG: Oh, I’m going to give that one to Justice
Ginsburg.
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG: I will quote the line Justice
O’Connor often uses. It was first expressed by a judge of the Supreme
Court of Minneapolis, Jeanne Coyne: “At the end of the day a wise old man
and a wise old woman will reach the same judgment.”46 But, Justice
O’Connor would add, and as I would, “We bring to the table something
that is lacking. We bring knowledge gained from growing up inside a
female body.” The Safford47 case, the strip search case, is a perfect
example. Every woman would understand what a mortifying experience
that was for a thirteen-year-old girl. Every man did not have that
understanding. It was good to have people at the table who could explain
the girl’s extreme discomfort to others.
The most important thing, I think, is the public perception of the Court
these days. Now one-third of the members are women, and we’re all over
the bench. When Justice O’Connor left, for a couple of years, I was the
lone woman. I’m not a very large person. It wasn’t the right picture. But
now, I am seated near center and Justice Kagan sits to my left, Justice
Sotomayor, to my right. It looks like we’re really there. Women belong on
the Court and it will never be otherwise. Those of you who have attended
46. See Jennifer M. Fitzenberger, M. Jeanne Coyne, Who Served on State Supreme
Court From 1982-96, Dies at 71, STAR TRIB., Aug. 7, 1998.
47. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
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court hearings lately will have observed that my two newest colleagues are
hardly shrinking violets. [laughter].
NINA TOTENBERG: I have to say, as somebody who’s covered the
Court for many decades, I certainly knew that there were three members of
the Court who were female when Justice Kagan, the first day that Justice
Kagan was sitting for oral argument. But to walk into that courtroom and
see, and they are brackets. There’s a woman at each end, and because of
seniority, Justice Ginsburg is quite close to the center. To walk into that
courtroom after years in which there was decades I covered the Court in
which there were no women. And then there was one, and then there was
two, and it was back to one again. To see that sort of density, it was
really—you try as a reporter not to have a stake in cases that are before the
Court. But, to walk into that courtroom and see that, it just really made my
heart swell with pride to be able to see that in my lifetime. Anybody else?
Well, okay. We’ve done this exactly on time. But that’s what you
expect when you have a woman running the show, right? [laughter and
applause].
END
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